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THE LIMITS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION
Cary Coglianese*
ABSTRACT
Performance-based regulation is widely heralded as a superior approach to regu-
lation. Rather than specifying the actions regulated entities must take,
performance-based regulation instead requires the attainment of outcomes and
gives flexibility in how to meet them. Despite nearly universal acclaim for perform-
ance-based regulation, the reasons supporting its use remain largely theoretical and
conjectural. Owing in part to a lack of a clear conceptual taxonomy, researchers
have yet to produce much empirical research documenting the strengths and weak-
nesses of performance-based regulation. In this Article, I provide a much-needed
conceptual framework for understanding and assessing performance-based regula-
tion. After defining performance-based regulation and distinguishing it from other
types of regulation, I also show that this kind of regulation can itself take many
forms, depending on the specificity of required outcomes, the proximity of these out-
comes to the regulatory goal, the way that performance is determined, the
underlying basis for required outcomes, the characteristics of the targeted regulated
entities, and the allocation of the burden of proving compliance. Variation along
these dimensions can ultimately result in widely varying impacts of different regu-
lations, which means that policy-makers cannot assume that every performance-
based regulation will work the same.
More importantly, this Article contributes a comprehensive consideration of the
dangers of performance-based regulation, illustrating with real-world examples how
this form of regulation can work poorly and even create its own problems, especially
when performance cannot be adequately defined, measured, or monitored. In high-
lighting the dangers of performance-based regulation, I do not suggest that it
should never be used; instead, I show that regulators must fully take into account
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the performance of performance-based regulation and not be swayed by intuitive
claims suggesting this form of regulation is a panacea. Despite its theoretical ad-
vantages, performance-based regulation also possesses limitations which must be
considered. Decision makers should carefully scrutinize both performance-based reg-
ulation and its alternatives, paying close attention to how each alternative will be
enforced and seeking to anticipate unintended consequences.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of regulation have long charged that it is too constraining,
unreasonable, and costly.1 These objections ring loudest whenever
a regulation rigidly requires every entity it targets to undertake the
same action or adopt the same technology, even though for some
entities or under some circumstances the required action or tech-
nology might be unduly expensive, ineffectual, or even
counterproductive. For many regulatory officials and analysts, the
better approach is to adopt performance-based regulation.2 This more
flexible form of regulation imposes outcome objectives on the
targets of regulation rather than dictating exactly what to do. In
other words, instead of telling businesses and other regulated enti-
ties exactly what actions they must take or technologies they must
adopt, performance-based regulation imposes binding perform-
ance or outcome targets and leaves it entirely to regulated firms to
determine how to achieve those targets.
Performance-based regulation has won acclaim from policymak-
ers and analysts the world over.3 In the United States, both
Republican and Democratic administrations have favored the use
of performance standards. President William Clinton, for example,
directed regulators in his administration to try to “specify perform-
ance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must adopt.”4 Ten years later,
President George W. Bush’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs similarly urged his administration to adopt performance
1. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994).
2. Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regulation: Pros-
pects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 707
(2003) (noting the “increasing attention” to the use of performance as a basis for
regulation).
3. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 199 (2006); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT, 11–12 (2013).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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standards whenever possible, asserting that they are “generally su-
perior” to other forms of regulation because they “give the
regulated parties the flexibility to achieve regulatory objectives in
the most cost-effective way.”5 Most recently, President Barack
Obama issued an executive order that reaffirmed his predecessors’
preferences for regulating via “performance objectives,” specifically
urging regulatory agencies to consider more opportunities to use
these “flexible approaches” to regulation.6
In addition to its bipartisan support in the United States, per-
formance-based regulation possesses a fan base that extends
throughout the world. The global trading regime operating under
the World Trade Organization formally favors the use of perform-
ance standards, with Article 2.8 of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) stating that, whenever appropriate, coun-
tries should craft technical regulations “in terms of performance
rather than design or descriptive characteristics.”7 Representatives
to the WTO’s Committee on TBT “have stressed . . . the advantages
of performance-based regulation”8 and urged that “[w]henever pos-
sible, . . . standards should be performance based rather than based
on design or descriptive characteristics.”9 Likewise, Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States have committed, as one of ten “common
regulatory principles” in a jointly adopted Regulatory Cooperation
Framework, to “[p]romote performance-based regulation” as much
as possible.10 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) has noted that “[t]he use of performance-
based regulation is rapidly developing in OECD countries.”11 Per-
formance-based regulation’s flexibility not only promises more cost-
effective outcomes, but also a simpler means of achieving the kind
of regulatory coordination that can help facilitate international
5. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS
(Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
6. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
7. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
8. WORLD TRADE ORG. COMM. ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, COMPILATION OF
SOURCES ON GOOD REGULATORY PRACTICE, G/TBT/W/341 (Sept. 13, 2011).
9. WORLD TRADE ORG. COMM. ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, DECISIONS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE WTO COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE SINCE
JANUARY 1, 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.12 (Jan. 21, 2015).
10. SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA, COMMON REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES 1 (2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/SPP-
Common-Regulatory-Principles.pdf. Separate recommendations emanating from Canada
have also favorably singled out performance standards. See, e.g., EXTERNAL ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON SMART REGULATION, SMART REGULATION: A REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR CANADA 11
(2004), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP22-78-2004E.pdf.
11. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION DEV., REGULATORY POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES:
FROM INTERVENTIONISM TO REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 135 (2002).
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trade. As a result, across a wide range of policy domains—occupa-
tional health and safety, environment and energy, building and fire
protection, nuclear reactor safety, and banking and securities, to
name a few—regulators and regulatory analysts around the world
advocate for and use performance-based regulatory approaches.
Despite global enthusiasm for performance-based regulation,
surprisingly little empirical research exists to show how such regula-
tion has actually worked in practice.12 Indeed, even though legal
and policy scholars have written widely on regulatory instrument
choice, the case for performance-based regulation still remains
largely theoretical. Admittedly, it does make intuitive sense that reg-
ulators would achieve more cost-effective outcomes by mandating
outcomes and giving firms flexibility in how to meet them. Yet,
global trends in regulatory strategy should be grounded in more
than just intuition. Given the enormous stakes for public welfare,
regulatory policy decisions should be grounded on a careful consid-
eration of evidence and a full weighing of the advantages and
disadvantages of alternatives.13 Of course, it is easier to identify a
need for empirical testing of performance-based regulation than to
perform such testing. Sorting out the distinctive positive and nega-
tive impacts associated with performance standards, as opposed to
other types of regulatory instruments, requires overcoming the dif-
ficulties of achieving randomization or applying statistical methods
12. Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 708. One exception can be found in
several accounts of building code regulations in New Zealand suggesting that the perform-
ance-based regulatory approach there contributed to a massive crisis in buildings prone to
severe mold and water damage. Peter May, Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes:
The Saga of Leaky Buildings, 25 LAW & POL’Y 381 (2003); Peter Mumford, Enhancing Perform-
ance-Based Regulation: Lessons from New Zealand’s Building Control System (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington), http://www.victo-
ria.ac.nz/vbs/research-services/documents/PeterMumford.pdf; Derek Gill, Regulatory
Coherence: The Case of New Zealand 22–34 (ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2016), http://www.
eria.org/ERIA-DP-2016-12.pdf. Another exception is a study of U.S. reformulated gasoline
performance standards, which indicates that these regulations failed because they gave refin-
ers too much flexibility. Maximilian Auffhammer & Ryan Kellogg, Clearing the Air? The Effects
of Gasoline Content Regulation on Air Quality, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2687 (2011).
13. In his same order affirming a preference for performance standards, President
Obama directed that regulatory agencies “must measure, and seek to improve, the actual
results of regulatory requirements.” Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011). See
also Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the Impact of Regulation and
Regulatory Policy (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. Expert Paper No. 1, 2012), http://
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [hereinafter Coglianese,
Measuring Regulatory Performance]; Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION (David Moss & John Cis-
ternino, eds., 2009); Cary Coglianese & Lori Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of
Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING (National Research Council
2005) [hereinafter Coglianese & Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies].
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to yield valid causal inferences.14 The empirical researcher must be
able to isolate the effect of the instrument type from all other fac-
tors that might explain regulatory outcomes.15
The development of a solid empirical base for recommending
performance-based regulation or any other regulatory strategy de-
pends first on understanding what these strategies are and what
they do. The field of regulation sorely lacks a clear and widely ac-
cepted conceptual taxonomy of regulatory design, which has
impeded research and unfortunately has too often clouded policy
judgment. Widespread variation in terminology about regulatory
instruments reveals that no system yet exists by which either govern-
ment officials or researchers can classify regulations by their type—
performance-based or otherwise—and thus begin systematically to
measure and compare the impacts associated with the selection of
different instruments.16 Further complicating the matter, rules
often come in packages, with performance standards combined to-
gether with other types of rules to impose several different types of
legal obligations on specific industries or economic practices. For
researchers to discover how the choice of instrument type affects
the benefits and costs of regulation, they must separate out per-
formance-based rules from other types of rules. To progress, what is
needed at the outset is a clearer and more widely-accepted defini-
tional and theoretical framework about performance-based
regulation.17
In this Article, I offer that much-needed conceptual framework
as a vital step toward better understanding and assessing perform-
ance-based regulation. In order to inform decisions about when a
performance-based regulatory strategy should—and should not—
be used, I present a clear taxonomical scheme for distinguishing
between performance-based instruments and other types of regula-
tion. I also show, importantly, that even when performance-based
regulation is properly conceived in a larger framework of regulatory
14. Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance, supra note 13, at 38–43; Ian Ayres, Yair
J. Listokin, & Michael Abramowicz, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011).
15. Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law and Empirical Analysis, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111,
1115 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Kenneth Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 284–85 (table A2) (2000) (detailing variation across fifteen sources
in terminology used to describe regulatory instruments).
17. Of course, this is not to deny that other obstacles will remain. For example, analyz-
ing longitudinal variation in regulatory standards may be complicated for reasons of path
dependence. If a technology standard is followed by a performance standard in the same
jurisdiction, firms that have already invested sunk costs in the old (required) technology may
well stick with it even if they would never have adopted that technology if a performance
standard had been adopted in the first place.
530 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
instruments, different performance-based regulatory strategies can
vary along a number of key dimensions that can affect their ulti-
mate impact, for good or ill. Drawing on real examples of
performance standards, I argue against the prevailing unalloyed en-
thusiasm for performance-based regulation and show how its
principal theoretical advantage—namely, its flexibility—can also
turn out in practice to be a major potential weakness. Without de-
nying that performance-based regulation can sometimes be the
appropriate choice for regulators, I offer a countervailing, and
counterintuitive, account that highlights its potential disadvan-
tages—we might even call them its dangers.
My purpose in highlighting the disadvantages of performance
standards is not to deny their potential advantages. Nor is it to sug-
gest that other instrument types are necessarily always better. On
the contrary, other regulatory instruments can have their problems
too; indeed, sometimes they suffer from some of the same problems
as performance standards. My aim is simply to show how perform-
ance-based regulation, as with any type of regulation, can work well
or poorly under different circumstances. Furthermore, how per-
formance standards are designed and how they are implemented
and enforced matters greatly. Rather than continuing to treat per-
formance standards with unbridled enthusiasm based on only
intuitive or theoretical assumptions, policy makers and researchers
need to take a careful look at how performance standards them-
selves actually perform. Although I hardly claim here to offer the
definitive or categorical assessment of performance-based regula-
tion under all circumstances, I do show that the performance of
performance-based regulation remains an open but vital empirical
question, one whose answer is long overdue.
Most worrisome of all, if researchers and regulators do not take
steps to understand more fully how performance-based regulation
works in practice, the disadvantages of this regulatory approach in
practice could very well come to outweigh its advantages in theory.
The recent Volkswagen diesel emissions debacle, for example,
shocked regulators around the world, as the car company flouted a
performance-based regulatory approach for more than seven years
by selling cars that emitted up to forty percent more pollution than
allowed under the applicable performance standards.18 Perhaps a
more clear-eyed assessment of the potential dangers associated with
performance-based regulation’s flexibility would have increased
18. Cary Coglianese, What Volkswagen Reveals about the Limits of Performance-Based Regula-
tion, REGBLOG (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/10/05/coglianese-volkswagen-
performance-based-regulation/.
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regulatory vigilance. Certainly, as I describe later in this Article, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should have been on
better guard, as it had encountered a very similar failing with its
performance standards over diesel truck emissions nearly twenty
years earlier. It is precisely because of the risks associated with ac-
cepting a “Panglossian” view of performance-based regulation that
we need frank recognition of its dangers in order to counteract the
prevailing view that tends to treat these standards as inherently su-
perior. Regulators need to see that they must approach the use of
performance-based regulation with the same level of care that they
would any instrument type—and perhaps, at times, even greater
care. As with any form of regulation, if performance-based regula-
tion is not designed and deployed well, it can prove costly,
ineffectual, and even dangerous.
I. WHAT IS PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION?
As with other terminology in public policy, the phrase “perform-
ance-based regulation” must be clearly defined, as it often means
different things to different people.19 In one important respect, all
regulation is or should be “performance-based”:20 all regulation is
or should be directed at changing the behavior of regulated entities
in ways that improve their performance in terms of enhancing so-
cial welfare. But such a capacious definition is obviously not very
useful. To define performance-based regulation more precisely, we
ought to start by distinguishing four main ways that performance
can be incorporated into regulation:21
1. Performance can be used as a basis for evaluating regula-
tory programs and agencies (evaluation or management).22
2. Performance can constitute a criterion for allocating en-
forcement and compliance resources (targeting).23
19. Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 708–09.
20. See Coglianese & Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies, supra note 13,
at 249.
21. See Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 709.
22. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance, supra note 13. See also EX-
ECUTIVE SESSION ON PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, GET RESULTS THROUGH
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: AN OPEN MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES 2–4
(2001), https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/get-results-through-performance-manage
ment-open-memorandum-state-and-local-government-executives (encouraging government
agencies to use performance to measure agency success).
23. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from
the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014)
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3. Performance can trigger the application of differentiated
or tiered regulatory standards (tracking).24
4. Performance can form the basis for legal or regulatory com-
mands (standards).25
Although each of these aspects of regulation can in principle be
“performance-based,” my focus here is on the last of these—the use
of performance as a basis for legal or regulatory commands. A per-
formance-based regulation in this last sense is often referred to as a
“performance standard.”
A performance standard specifies a required outcome but leaves
the means of achieving that outcome to the discretion of the regu-
lated entity. Consider several concrete examples of this general
definition from different regulatory contexts:
• The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
does not specify how manufacturers must package
medicines to make it hard for children to open the packages
and poison themselves. Instead, it imposes a performance
standard for child-resistant packaging. Packaging manufac-
turers must test any new designs with a sample of four-year
old children who are instructed to open the package. The
basic standard is that eighty-five percent of the children
must be unable to open the package within five minutes.26
The CPSC does not tell manufacturers how to construct bot-
tle caps or other child-resistant features of packaging; it just
says the packages have to resist opening by the vast majority
of children in tests.
• The U.K. Department of Trade and Industry adopted regu-
lations in 1999 designed to address air pollution from a
variety of off-road mobile sources, such as tractors, bulldoz-
ers, fork-lifts, and other machines. Rather than specifying
exactly how engines in these many different types of equip-
ment needed to be built, the Department imposed a set of
performance standards. These performance standards were
(describing how EPA, in addition to recognizing Performance Track members, also desig-
nated members as low priorities for enforcement).
24. See, e.g., id. (explaining that Performance Track members were also subject to re-
duced regulatory and administrative requirements).
25. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY:
SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 23 (1999) (“[A] performance standard is one which specifies the
outcome of the . . . improvement but which leaves the concrete measures to achieve this end
open for the employer to adapt to varying local circumstances.”).
26. 16 C.F.R. § 1700.20 (2015).
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stated in terms of “limit values” that a prototype engine
needed to meet before the manufacturer could receive a
certificate of approval, authorizing the sale of the engines in
equipment. To demonstrate that an engine could meet the
performance standards, a governmental authority would
connect the prototype to an emissions analyzer and run the
engine in accordance with a detailed testing protocol. As
long as levels of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbon, nitrogen
oxides, and particulates did not exceed the limit values, the
engine would pass the test and receive the certificate of
approval.27
• The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) operates under a statute that requires vehicle
safety standards to “be stated in objective terms,” which the
agency construes as directing it to issue performance stan-
dards.28 After Congress in 1991 required automobile
manufacturers to install air bags in most of their vehicles,29
NHTSA issued standards for air bags that specified the level
of performance air bag systems must meet.30 Measured using
now-famous crash-test dummies, air bag systems are re-
quired to protect the dummies from specific levels of force
related to injury on test crashes into rigid barriers. NHTSA
did not tell auto manufacturers exactly how they needed to
design, make, or install their air bags; manufacturers just
needed to pass the performance test.
• Buildings in New Zealand must meet the requirements con-
tained in a performance-based building code. As the New
Zealand government explains, the code “states how a build-
ing must perform in its intended use rather than describing
how the building must be designed and constructed.”31 For
example, the buildings in which nursing homes or day care
centers are housed “shall have provision for maintaining the
internal temperature at no less than 16°C measured at 750
mm above floor level, while the space is adequately venti-
lated.” To prevent fires, one of the relevant code provisions
27. The Non-Road Mobile Machinery Regulations, Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1053, art.
2, ¶ 6 (UK).
28. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2015).
29. 56 Fed. Reg. 26039 (June 6, 1991).
30. 58 Fed. Reg. 46551 (Sept. 2, 1993).
31. Building Code, NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT,
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/the-building-code (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). For provisions of the
code cited in this paragraph, see Building Regulations 1992, sch 1, cls G5.3.1, C2.2, C6.3,
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/1992/0150/latest/DLM162576.html.
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requires that the “maximum surface temperature of com-
bustible building materials close to fixed appliances using
controlled combustion and other fixed equipment when op-
erating at their design level must not exceed 90°C.” Rather
than requiring stairways be made of metal, the building
code states that they “must be designed and constructed so
that they remain stable during and after fire.”
Given the widespread use of performance standards around the
world, it is not difficult to find many other examples from other
jurisdictions and areas of regulatory policy.
These examples make clear how a performance standard stands
in contrast to a “means” standard—that is, one which specifies ex-
actly how the regulated entity must act (presumably, in order to
achieve a desired level of performance). Means standards are also
sometimes known as prescriptive standards, command-and-control
regulation, specification standards, design standards, or technol-
ogy-based standards.32
Means standards suffer from several disadvantages. First, for
some regulated entities, the mandated means may not prove as ef-
fective as other means. Second, for some regulated entities, the
mandated means may prove to be more costly than other equally
effective means. Finally, by specifying how to act, means standards
can inhibit innovation toward better or cheaper ways to achieve the
same outcomes. By giving firms flexibility to choose their own
means to achieve the desired goals, performance standards theoret-
ically allow firms to select the most effective or lowest-cost options.
Performance standards may also place fewer obstacles in the way of
innovation as well as the kind of harmonization needed to facilitate
international trade.
Performance-based regulation bears certain affinities or relation-
ships to several other regulatory terms or concepts, including:
• Market-based regulation. Typically, performance standards re-
quire all regulated entities to achieve the same level of
32. At the risk of adding to nomenclature confusion, it bears noting that what some
people call “technology-based standards” are actually performance standards that are based on
what is achievable by existing technologies. Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not
So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991). Fur-
thermore, performance standards are themselves sometimes lumped under the banner of
command-and-control regulation when they require a uniform level of performance for all
regulated entities, as opposed to allowing different firms to meet different performance
levels as under market-based instruments. See, e.g., ROBERT N. STAVINS, A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE
SYSTEM TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).
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performance. For example, an emission limit in an air pollu-
tion control law will mean that all smokestacks must ensure
that they emit no more than the level of chemicals specified
in the limit. With market-based regulation, however, entities
are not required to achieve uniform levels of performance,
but instead they may average, trade, or bank performance
units.33 Emissions trading regimes—sometimes called trad-
able emissions permits or just “cap and trade”—are
examples of market-based air pollution control regulation.34
It is important to understand that market-based regulation is
a type of performance standard, but just not one in which
each firm must achieve the same level of performance.
• Self-regulation. Self-regulation refers to rules that are imposed
by a private firm or a trade association on itself or its own
members.35 The term focuses on the identity of the “regula-
tor”—the industry, in the case of self-regulation, as opposed
to the government. Self-regulation is flexible in the sense
that a firm or an industry trade group gets to choose what
the regulation will be. But the nature of the rules adopted
by a self-regulator may be, just as with rules adopted by any
regulator, either means-based or performance-based.
• Management-based regulation. A requirement that regulated
entities engage in their own planning and internal rulemak-
ing efforts aimed at the achievement of specific public goals
is sometimes considered to be “performance-based,” but is
more properly called a management-based regulation.36
Under a management-based regulation, a firm can choose
what actions it will take to achieve the public goal motivating
the regulation. Such an approach sometimes has been re-
ferred to as “enforced self-regulation”37—and sometimes,
33. Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION 31–76 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, eds., 2d ed. 2000).
34. Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from
SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (1998); Thomas Tietenberg, Cap-and-Trade: The
Evolution of an Economic Idea, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 359 (2010).
35. Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 147 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, eds.,
2010).
36. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Man-
agement to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692–96 (2003).
37. See generally John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime
Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–32 (1992); and BRIDGET HUT-
TER, REGULATION AND RISK: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ON THE RAILWAYS 135–57
(2001).
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probably because of the flexibility it affords regulated enti-
ties, it even parades under the banner of performance-based
regulation.38 Yet, management-based regulation is in fact a
type of means standard, as it requires firms to engage in a
variety of specific means related to planning and other man-
agement activities. No achievement of a specified level of
performance is required under a management-based regula-
tion—and indeed, in many cases regulated entities are not
even required to follow their own mandated but internally
constructed plans.39 It is often only the planning itself that is
required.
• Information disclosure. Information disclosure regulation can
require firms to report their levels of performance.40 But it is
actually a type of means standard, as it requires firms engage
in very specific activities related to the collection and report-
ing of information. By itself, information disclosure
regulation does not require firms to achieve any specified
level of performance.
• Equivalency clauses or waiver provisions. Equivalency clauses or
waivers may be used to supplement means standards. Under
equivalency provisions, firms may choose alternative means
that achieve equivalent levels of performance as the man-
dated means.41 They might thus be considered a type of
“back-door” performance standard. Equivalency clauses or
waivers exhibit a key feature of certain performance stan-
dards, discussed below. That is, they typically place the
burden of proof on the firm to demonstrate that the re-
quired performance level has been met. They also often
require advance governmental approval.
38. See, e.g., Safety Management Systems for Part 121 Certificate Holders, 75 Fed. Reg.
68224, 68224–25 (Nov. 5, 2010) (proposing a rule that would require operators “to develop
and implement a safety management system (SMS)” which the agency considers to be a “per-
formance-based regulation”); Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering
Pipelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 20722, 20816 (Apr. 8, 2016) (characterizing requirements for the
implementation of integrity management systems as a type of “performance-based”
regulation).
39. See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); Lori Snyder Bennear,
Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox?, in LEVERAG-
ING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, eds., 2006).
40. See generally Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environ-
mental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613–15 (1999).
41. Coglianese, Nash, & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 713.
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• Codes of practice or guidance. Somewhat the mirror image of
equivalency clauses, codes of practice are non-binding
means standards that may be used to supplement perform-
ance standards.42 Under such guidance, firms are given the
option to choose to implement the means stated in the code
in lieu of meeting the performance standard. Codes of prac-
tice are thought to be especially helpful to smaller firms.
It is important to see that not every type of flexible regulatory in-
strument is performance-based.43 Management-based regulation
and information disclosure give a considerable amount of ultimate
discretion to the firm, but they do require the firm to carry out very
specific means—either planning or the collection and dissemina-
tion of information. By contrast, other flexible approaches, such as
market-based regulation and equivalency clauses, provide their flex-
ibility in the same way that performance standards do: by imposing
obligations to achieve outcomes without mandating the adoption of
any particular means of achieving those outcomes.
II. DIFFERENCES IN PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Just as there are differences between performance standards and
other related regulatory instruments, so too are there vast differ-
ences in the types of rules that fall within the category of
performance standards. Performance standards can differ along at
least six different dimensions.
1. Specificity (loose vs. tight)
Performance standards can be loose, such as in an airworthiness
rule requiring civil aircraft to be in an “airworthy condition.”44 Or
these standards can be tightly specified, such as with motor vehicle
brake standards that require motor vehicles to “[d]ecelerat[e] to a
stop from 20 miles per hour at not less than” 20 feet for “vehicles
with a seating capacity of 10 persons or less, including driver, and
built on a passenger car chassis.”45
42. Id. at 712.
43. See generally Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Flexible Environmental Regulation,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael
Kraft, eds., 2012) [hereinafter Bennear & Coglianese, Flexible Environmental Regulation].
44. 14 C.F.R. § 91.7 (2015).
45. 49 C.F.R. § 393.52 (2015).
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Note that both of these standards address the performance of
some technology—airplanes or automobile brakes—but neither are
technology standards that specify the use of a certain technology.
Rather, they define the outcomes the technologies are supposed to
achieve, either in loose or tight terms.
Sometimes loosely specified regulation is referred to as princi-
ples-based regulation, which articulates general guiding tenets. But
since it is possible that some “principles” could speak to means as
well as ends,46 I do not consider principles-based regulation as al-
ways or necessarily referring to loose performance standards.
2. Proximity between legal command and regulatory goal
(close vs. distant)
Performance standards can have a close or distant connection
between the legal command and the regulatory goal. For example,
the general duty clause in the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety
at Work Act of 1974 imposes a binding obligation on any employer
to “ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and
welfare at work of all his employees.”47 Contrast that provision with
a U.K. Health and Safety Executive regulation setting a “workplace
exposure limit” of two parts per million (ppm) of formaldehyde
exposure over an eight-hour period.48 The regulatory goal in both
of these cases is to protect workers’ health, a goal that the first rule
actually embeds in its command. With the second standard, there
are one or more physiological steps between exposure at a level
above the limit and any actual health problems a worker might ex-
perience. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that some workers
exposed to (slightly) impermissible levels of formaldehyde might
not suffer any diminution in health whatsoever. But, the second
standard is still based on a determination that there is a causal con-
nection between some unacceptably high level of exposure and the
public concern motivating the regulation, while the first standard is
stated expressly in terms of that public concern.
46. The Clean Air Act includes standards based on “reasonably available” pollution con-
trol technology. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2012).
47. Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, c. 37 § 2 (U.K.).
48. Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994, sch. 1.
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3. How performance is determined (measured vs. predicted)
Methods of determining performance can include (a) direct ob-
servation of actual outputs or outcomes (on a continuous or
periodic basis), (b) testing under conditions similar to actual condi-
tions, or (c) computer simulations based on models of the
relationship between inputs and outputs.49 Often the performance
in a regulatory standard can be measured, such as when an environ-
mental regulator monitors manufacturers’ compliance with motor
vehicle exhaust standards by connecting emissions analyzers by a
hose to a vehicle’s exhaust and directly measuring the emissions
that come out for a specified period of time.50 Yet, at times, per-
formance cannot be measured at all, but must be predicted or
modeled. As Notarianni and Fischbeck note with respect to per-
formance-based fire safety standards for buildings, “direct
measurement of the performance of a building is not usually possi-
ble” because doing so would require that “full-scale prototypes of
the building . . . be built and then burned under various scena-
rios.”51 In still other circumstances, it may be possible to predict
outputs simply by measuring inputs, such as in estimating how
much sulfur dioxide will be emitted from a coal-powered plant
based on data on the sulfur content of the coal being burned.
4. Basis for the standard (ideal vs. feasible)
Performance standards can vary in terms of the basis or justifica-
tion of the required level of performance. Sometimes the required
level of performance may seek to achieve an “ideal” state, such as
when the U.S. Clean Air Act’s risk-based national ambient air qual-
ity standards are set at levels determined “to protect the public
health,” “allowing an adequate margin of safety.”52 Other times,
rather than basing standards on some ideal level of tolerable risk,
performance standards may be set based on what is technologically
feasible—in other words, at a level that achieves as many benefits as
possible until the costs become unacceptable. An example would be
49. For an example of direct measurement, see EPA, 70 Fed. Reg. 28606 (May 18, 2005)
(imposing performance standards for mercury emissions from coal-burning power plants to
be satisfied by use of continuous emissions monitoring technology). For examples of the
other methods of performance assessment, see infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
50. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 86 et seq. (2015).
51. Kathy Notarianni & Paul S. Fischbeck, Performance with Uncertainty: A Process for Imple-
menting Performance-Based Fire Regulations, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT,
HEALTH AND SAFETY 234 (Paul S. Fischbeck and R. Scott Farrow, eds., 2001).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
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the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards, set at a
level “which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction.”53
A still further way to determine the level of a performance standard
would be to conduct a benefit-cost analysis to find an economically
optimal level. As should be evident, the degree of stringency of a
performance standard will generally follow from the basis for the
standard. That stringency matters.
5. Unit of regulation (individual vs. aggregate)
A performance standard can be applied to narrow or broad
targets. The target—or the unit of regulation—is the entity or phys-
ical thing that must meet the required level of performance. For
example, the unit of regulation could be at an individual level: each
automobile produced by an automobile manufacturer must emit
no more than a specified level of pollution.54 Or the unit can be an
aggregation: the average emissions of all the cars in an automobile
manufacturers’ fleet must meet the specified level of pollution.55
The total level of pollution could well turn out to be the same
under either approach, but the way performance is specified in the
regulation can be either individualized or aggregated in some fash-
ion. The EPA’s “bubble policy” for stationary sources of air
pollution is another example of an aggregated performance stan-
dard.56 This policy allows facilities to average emissions from across
all of their point sources, so long as the aggregate level of emissions
does not exceed a specified level.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
54. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-04(c) (2016) (detailing emissions requirements for indi-
vidual vehicles). The requirements in state inspection and maintenance programs called for
under the Clean Air Act demand that existing automobiles meet emissions limits on an indi-
vidual basis. See, e.g., 67 Pa. Code §§ 177.51, 177.53, 177.204 (detailing emissions
requirements for individual vehicles).
55. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-4(d) (2016) (detailing fleetwide emissions require-
ments). Fuel economy standards are another example of a fleetwide performance standard
for automobiles. See generally Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION, https://www.transportation.gov/mission/sustainability/corpor
ate-average-fuel-economy-cafe-standards (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
56. 46 Fed. Reg. 50766 (Oct. 14, 1981); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding EPA’s bubble policy for stationary sources of pollu-
tion). See generally THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY (1985).
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6. Burden of proof (regulator vs. regulated)
Finally, performance standards can differ in terms of how they
allocate the burden of proof. Sometimes, as with equivalency
clauses or waiver provisions, the burden of proof is placed on the
regulated entity to show that it has achieved or can achieve the
stated level of performance. For example, under fire safety code
exemptions, a contractor must demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the government that an alternative design or plan will provide an
equivalent level of safety.57 In most contexts, though, it is up to the
regulator to prove that the regulated firm has failed to achieve the
required level of performance.58 It is typically the regulator that
must demonstrate that a firm emitted pollution over the applicable
performance limit or that the bottle caps on a medicine bottle
failed to pass the child safety performance test.
* * *
These differences within the general category of performance
standards matter for the same reason that it is important to under-
stand variations among regulatory instruments more generally:
different types of performance standards create different incentives
and costs for firms. The extent to which a given performance stan-
dard will in practice allow for innovation and cost-effectiveness will
depend on the specific characteristics of the standards under con-
sideration. The more a regulated firm bears the burden of proof,
for example, then the more it must spend to demonstrate perform-
ance, and less innovation will take place (all other things being
equal).
III. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND INNOVATION
As noted in a recent WTO committee report, it is often thought
that “[p]erformance based regulation is more easily adaptable and
encourages innovation.”59 This is a common claim made about per-
formance standards.60 But what exactly does it mean?
Performance standards provide flexibility that can allow for inno-
vation because a regulated entity may be able to meet the mandated
57. For an example taken from the fire safety standards for federally funded buildings,
see 15 U.S.C. § 2227(a) (3) (2011) and 41 C.F.R. § 102.80-105 et seq. (2015).
58. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.7 (4th ed. 2002).
59. WORLD TRADE ORG. COMM. ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, supra note 8 (empha-
sis added).
60. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., REGULATORY REFORM AND INNOVATION
(1997).
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outcome in any number of ways.61 Even if there might only cur-
rently exist one way to meet a performance standard, human
ingenuity can be applied to identify new ways. Over time, the kind
of flexibility built into performance standards may permit regulated
entities to find ways to meet the regulation’s objectives that are
even less costly than any means known at the time the regulation is
adopted.
Although the innovation possibilities of performance standards
mark one of their chief theoretical advantages, it is important to
recognize that performance standards do not by themselves actually
encourage innovation. That is, there is nothing in the specification of
a required end-state that for that reason provides any new incen-
tives for innovation. The incentives for innovation exist outside of
the regulation, in the overall competitive business environment
that drives regulated firms to look for new, less costly ways to
achieve regulatory goals. While performance standards facilitate
such innovation, since the regulatory scheme gives firms flexibility,
the performance standards alone do not actually drive the
innovation.62
It is somewhat of a misconception to think that performance
standards will induce innovation (as opposed merely to allow for in-
novation). There is also another corollary misconception—that
means-based standards lock-in existing technologies and do not al-
low for innovation. This is not necessarily so, as means-based rules
typically contain options for obtaining waivers—and, of course,
there is always a background option of amending a means standard
to authorize or require a different kind of means. Ultimately, then,
the choice between means standards and performance standards is
not one between no innovation and robust innovation. The reality is
more complicated.
That reality is still more complicated if the stringency of a stan-
dard is taken into account. Until now, I have focused attention on
the form of performance standards as compared to the form of
other types of regulatory instruments, explaining that the flexibility
provided by performance standards does not, by itself, provide an
incentive for innovation. But form is not the same as stringency. De-
pending on their level of stringency, performance standards can
61. W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE
130–31 (1983) (“The central advantage of performance standards is that the firm has the
opportunity to select the least costly means of compliance.”).
62. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1984) (“A performance standard
permits flexibility and change.”) (emphasis added).
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indeed encourage innovation. If a performance standard is strin-
gent enough that it can only be met through new technologies that
are not currently available, firms will be encouraged to innovate (or
to abandon their line of business).63
A further qualification can arise with types of performance stan-
dards that allow for non-uniformity of performance, so-called
market-based regulation. This form of performance-based regula-
tion (and only this form) can encourage innovation through its
form, entirely separate from stringency.64 To understand why, recall
the example of an emissions permits trading regime, a non-uniform
environmental performance-based regulation. A permit-trading re-
gime is performance-based in that the regulated firm must never
exceed the level of emissions authorized by the number of permits
that it holds. But firms are allowed to buy and sell those permits, so
that some firms may have more permits than others. Allowing firms
to aggregate emissions by buying and selling permits provides an
incentive for innovation, because if a firm can improve its perform-
ance it can sell its excess permits in the marketplace.65
Outside of stringency and marketability, the degree to which per-
formance standards allow for innovation will vary because
innovation is risky and costly for regulated entities. Costs can some-
times be affected by the standard itself. All other things being
equal, the more difficult it is for the regulated entity to demon-
strate it has met the required level of performance, the less
innovation will take place. Key factors affecting the difficulty of
demonstrating performance include the burden of proof and the stan-
dard of proof. Must the regulated entity satisfy the burden of proof
and demonstrate to the regulator that it meets the performance
standard, say, through either (a) regular reporting or (b) preap-
proval of an innovative approach? Or must the regulator bring an
enforcement action and bear the burden of proof? Moreover, what
standard of proof (e.g., kind of evidence and level of certainty) is
required? How costly is it to operationalize and measure perform-
ance? How much uncertainty will the regulator tolerate (e.g.,
preponderance of evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt)?
63. Nicholas A. Ashford, Christine Ayers, & Robert F. Stone, Using Regulation to Change
the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985).
64. Stavins, supra note 33, at 33.
65. Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The
Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGM’T S43,
S45–46 (1995).
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The answers to questions like these will likely affect, in practice, the
resulting level of innovation permitted by performance standards.66
To illustrate, contrast the CPSC’s standards for child-resistant
packaging, described earlier,67 with the Clark County (Nevada)
building commission’s performance-based equivalency clause.68 In
the former, if a manufacturer fails to meet the packaging standard,
the CPSC must bring an enforcement action and meet its burden of
showing that the product package is unsafe. In the case of the Clark
County building commission, which oversees building construction
in Las Vegas, the burden is on the firm to demonstrate it can
achieve a level of performance equivalent to the applicable means
standards. When Circus Circus Enterprises proposed a new design
for its thirty-story Luxor Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, the build-
ing’s unique pyramidal shape and large internal atrium did not
comply with the county’s existing “prescriptive” code provisions ad-
dressing the ventilation of smoke.69 Circus Circus therefore had to
proceed under a performance-based equivalency clause, demon-
strating to the county building regulators that the hotel’s
alternative ventilation systems would provide a level of performance
in the event of fire equivalent to a traditional building following the
means-based code.70 The burden of proof was on Circus Circus, and
meeting it required the use of extensive computer simulation,
third-party testing, and ultimate simulations with theatrical
smoke—all with multiple reviews undertaken by county officials.71
We can expect that, all things being equal, the closer perform-
ance standards are to the Clark County equivalency clause process,
the less innovation will take place. I also propose a corollary: all
other things being equal, the more responsive the regulator is to
making exceptions or changes to means-based regulation, the more
innovation can be expected to take place. The key takeaway is that
with performance standards, as with means standards, there will be
tradeoffs between the level of certainty demanded by the regulator
and the degree to which innovation will likely occur. By varying the
66. See generally Kathy Notarianni & Paul S. Fischbeck, Performance with Uncertainty: A Pro-
cess for Implementing Performance-Based Fire Regulations, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN
ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND SAFETY 234–39 (Paul S. Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow, eds., 2001).
67. 16 C.F.R. § 1700.20, supra note 26.
68. Douglas H. Evans, Robert D. Weber & James R. Quiter, Luxor Hotel and Casino: An
Application of Performance-Based Fire Safety Design Methods, Proceedings of the 1998 Pacific Rim
Conference and Second International Conference on Performance-Based Codes and Fire
Safety Design Methods (1998).
69. Douglas Evans, Unique Smoke Management Designs, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING,
Summer 2000, at 9–10.
70. Id. at 10.
71. See id.
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burden and standard of proof, regulators can design performance
standards in ways that increase the benefits from certainty in the
achievement of the desired outcomes—but doing so can also in-
crease costs to regulated firms and actually inhibit innovation. Not
all performance standards will allow for, let alone encourage, much
innovation.72
IV. WHEN SHOULD GOVERNMENTS CHOOSE
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS?
The discussion so far should make clear that performance stan-
dards allow for flexibility along two dimensions. The first is cross-
sectional flexibility, which enables what might be called “fitness,” be-
cause performance standards allow for differently situated firms to
meet the required outcomes in the ways that best fit their own cir-
cumstances.73 With fitness, the question is this: To what degree does
one size truly fit all? The second dimension is longitudinal flexibility,
which I have been just discussing—flexibility over time allows for
innovation.
The more heterogeneous a regulated sector, either cross-section-
ally or longitudinally, the greater the cost savings that can accrue
from allowing firms to choose their own means rather than requir-
ing every firm to adopt identical means.74 A regulated sector will be
cross-sectionally heterogeneous when firms come in different sizes,
use different processes or techniques, draw upon different supply
chains, face different prices for labor or capital, or exhibit any num-
ber of other differences that affect the costs of meeting regulatory
objectives. For example, the industry covered by the U.K.’s non-
road mobile machine emissions standards is quite heterogeneous,
72. A similar analysis could be made of performance standards’ oft-claimed advantage in
regulatory harmonization and the facilitation of international trade. Means standards can
certainly be harmonized to facilitate trade better, if they are made to be identical. With suffi-
cient interest, trading partners can surely reach agreements on compatible or identical
means standards. On the other hand, as the discussion in this and the previous section of this
Article should make clear, depending on how countries’ performance standards are de-
signed, they may afford little meaningful harmonization potential, such as if each requires
different but expensive testing protocols or measurement techniques. Performance stan-
dards provide no logically inherent advantage in terms of harmonization merely because they
take a performance-based form.
73. See Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 707. See also Earl Blumenauer,
Beyond the Backlash: Using Performance-Based Regulations to Produce Results Through Innovation, 26
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 351, 364–65 (2011).
74. See VISCUSI, supra, note 61, at 131 (“The greatest gains from this discretion [granted
by performance standards] arise from the wide variations in technologies of different vintage
and type.”).
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as the firms making farm tractors are quite different from those
that make fork-lifts and construction trucks—and, of course, the
products they make are different as well.75 By contrast, a sector will
be heterogeneous longitudinally, if there is a high likelihood that
the sector—or its products and processes—will change over time.
The financial sector—as with nearly anything today having to do
with digital technology—experiences considerable, and often
rapid, changes over time.76
Although performance standards can result in cost-savings under
conditions of heterogeneity, these standards depend on perform-
ance being reliably measured in some way, whether through direct
measurement, testing, simulation, or modeling.77 Thus, as I have
illustrated elsewhere, the choice between performance standards
and means standards requires a careful assessment of both the reg-
ulated firms’ heterogeneity and the regulator’s ability to measure
the relevant outputs or outcomes.78 The resulting Figure 1, below,
shows where the three primary approaches to regulation would be
best suited. If performance standards are most appropriate under
conditions of heterogeneity and when the regulator can assess out-
put well, Figure 1 shows that means standards are appropriate when
output assessment is difficult (or costly) and when most of the firms
will be the same, both cross-sectionally and over time. When regu-
lated firms are similar and stay that way, one size truly does fit all.
Finally, as David Lazer and I have shown elsewhere, management-
based regulation fits well in circumstances fitting into the lower-left
quadrant of Figure 1, where heterogeneity is high but the regula-
tor’s capacity to assess outputs is limited.79
While the framework in Figure 1 provides a very rough heuristic
for thinking about the choice between performance-based and
means-based regulation, it is helpful to consider further the condi-
tions under which these two approaches to regulation may be
appropriate. Especially given the almost universal enthusiasm for
75. Outline of Non-Road Mobile Machinery (NRMM) Emissions Regulations, VEHICLE CERTIFI-
CATION AGENCY, http://www.dft.gov.uk/vca/other/non-road-mobile-mach.asp (last visited
Jan. 21, 2017).
76. Parts of the economy that touch on both the financial sector and information tech-
nology will presumably be even more prone to frequent change over time. At least that is the
argument eBay has recently made in advancing a case for a performance-based approach to
regulation of its PayPal business. See PAYPAL & EBAY INC., 21ST CENTURY REGULATION: PUTTING
INNOVATION AT THE HEART OF PAYMENTS REGULATION (2013), http://www.ebaymainstreet.
com/sites/default/files/PayPal-Payment-Regulations-Booklet_US.pdf.
77. See Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 715.
78. Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy, in RISK
AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 167–68 (2010).
79. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 36, at 705.
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FIGURE 1: CONDITIONS FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED AND


















performance-based regulation—with, as already noted, strictures
adopted by the last several presidential administrations in the
United States seeking effectively to privilege performance standards
as a default choice for government regulators80—decision makers
might do well to ask whether performance-based regulation is in-
deed usually better. Obviously the answer will depend on the
circumstances under which performance standards would be ap-
plied, but it is possible to say more by considering how performance
and means standards might compare in terms of the demands they
place on the regulator.
Since the principal advantage of performance-based regulation
lies in the cost-savings afforded by its greater flexibility, let us imag-
ine a decision-making scenario in which benefits are held constant.
In other words, imagine that a regulator faces a choice between
adopting a means standard and a performance standard, each with
identical social benefits because both will achieve equivalent levels
of risk reduction or other social improvements. Although in reality
such an assumption might rarely hold, for purposes of analysis it is
80. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); OFFICE OF INFO.
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 5; Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18,
2011).
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a useful one to make.81 It allows us to consider the best case for
performance-based regulation, namely one where it is more cost-
effective, achieving identical societal benefits for lower overall cost
to society (especially in the form of compliance costs to firms).
Counter-intuitively, even in such circumstances where both types of
standards might yield identical societal benefits, it still may some-
times be better for regulators to adopt means standards.
If benefits to society are held constant, the choice between a
means standard and a performance standard in any particular regu-
latory context will turn on their relative costs. Here, it is important
to keep in mind two kinds of costs. The first, which I will call “social
costs,” contains the kind of costs that would typically enter into a
conventional benefit-cost analysis: opportunity costs to firms (com-
pliance costs) and any costs of negative side-effects associated with
the regulation. The second kind of cost, which typically does not
enter directly into the equation of a benefit-cost analysis, is the kind
that the government must incur in developing and enforcing the
rule. These “governmental costs” or “administrative costs” are typi-
cally much smaller than the social costs and social benefits of
regulation and therefore it is typically of little consequence if they
are not explicitly taken into consideration in a regulatory impact
analysis. Moreover, since governmental costs are paid for by taxes,
they can in theory be recouped through transfer payments—in
other words, they do not represent a real opportunity cost, at least
to society overall.82
But from the very real standpoint of day-to-day operations, gov-
ernmental costs do matter. A regulator is constrained, and cannot
simply raise taxes to pay for the costs associated with developing
and enforcing a new regulation.83 As a result, two key practical ques-
tions arise for a regulator choosing between performance and
means standards which would each deliver equal social benefits: (1)
How much social cost-saving will a performance standard likely
yield? (2) Are the savings in social costs sufficient to justify any addi-
tional investment of governmental resources to create and monitor
81. After all, even though real-world policy decisions are rarely as simple as this exam-
ple, governments are often urged to regulate in the most cost-effective way. See, e.g., Draft
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation, 67 Fed. Reg. 15014,
15,030 15,032-33 (Mar. 28, 2002) (reporting on international efforts to make regulation sim-
pler and less costly).
82. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 38.
83. GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 1 (1987) (“In virtually every case the scope of agency responsibility and authority
greatly exceeds the resources provided.”).
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performance standards? Again, because the social benefits are as-
sumed to be the same, the only tradeoff is between cost-savings to
the regulated community (which is what reduces the social costs of
performance standards) and the relative differences in administra-
tive costs to the government.
Governmental costs—the transaction costs associated with instru-
ment choice—can turn out to be crucial. After all, in a world with
no governmental costs, there would be no difference between
means standards and performance standards.84 The government
regulator could create highly specified means standards, so that
cross-sectional fitness could be perfectly addressed. Similarly, the
regulator could adapt regulations effortlessly in response to innova-
tion and other changing circumstances over time. In a world with
no governmental costs, means standards could be seamlessly tai-
lored to fit any different or changing circumstance.
Obviously, we do not live in a world with zero governmental
costs. The challenge for regulators is to use their limited resources
in a way that maximizes social welfare.85 Consider a highly stylized
example of a choice between two hypothetical standards, one
means-based and one performance-based. As illustrated in Table 1,
below, both standards would result in the same level of social bene-
fits, but the performance standard would yield these benefits at half
the costs, because firms could innovate to find their own lowest-cost
means to achieve the desired output. (The numbers in the table are
in common units, such as money.) As a result, the “net social bene-
fits” (social benefits minus social costs) of the performance
standard would be greater. This is the main reason why policy mak-
ers and scholars enthusiastically profess to prefer performance
standards.
TABLE 1: A STYLIZED CHOICE BETWEEN A MEANS STANDARD
AND A PERFORMANCE STANDARD
Hypothetical Hypothetical
Regulation A Regulation B
(Means Standard) (Performance Standard)
Social Benefits 200 200
Social Costs 100 50
Net Social Benefits 100 150
Governmental Costs 25 50
Overall Net Benefits 75 100
84. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 36, at 703.
85. See generally John D. Graham & Paul R. Noe, Beyond Process Excellence: Enhancing Socie-
tal Well-Being, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 72–87 (Cary Coglianese, ed., 2017).
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Yet consider what happens when we add in governmental costs. If
the performance standard were to prove more costly to govern-
ment—say because such a standard would impose greater costs for
monitoring compliance in order to achieve the same social bene-
fits—these costs would need to be added to the calculus. Now, if the
administrative costs to government were merely treated as an addi-
tional kind of social costs, they could be subtracted from the net
social benefits, with a resulting final “overall net benefits” (see Table
1). If the governmental or administrative costs of regulating are
dwarfed by the social costs, as they often are in reality by several
orders of magnitude, they will rarely affect the bottom line in any
comparison between means standards and performance stan-
dards—just as they do not affect the hypothetical bottom line in
Table 1. Performance standards still outperform means standards
in this illustration.
Yet are performance standards really the preferred regulatory ap-
proach in this example? Not necessarily. If the regulator faces a
constrained budget and needs to make a choice that yields the most
“bang for the buck,” it should choose the means standard under
the conditions presented in Table 1. Why? For an investment of
twenty-five, the regulator yields net social benefits of one hundred
with the means standard, a return on investment of four to one.
The return on investment for the performance standard is only
three to one. To put the point somewhat differently, in the example
in Table 1 the regulator could implement two means standards for
the price of one performance standard, and doing so would result
in thirty-three percent more net social benefits. Of course, this styl-
ized example should not be taken to suggest that means standards
will always be preferable; only that they may sometimes be. The key
in many cases will be to consider what goes into computing the gov-
ernmental costs. In other words, what does it take for government
to be able to ensure that a performance standard and a means stan-
dard can yield comparable social benefits? In terms of
governmental costs, there might be two kinds: the cost of crafting a
suitable regulatory instrument (rulemaking), and the cost of moni-
toring and enforcing the rule (implementation).86 Performance
standards may spare the government the cost of finding the one
choice that fits all best, but they might sometimes also be more
costly to monitor and enforce.
86. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). See also KRISTIN E.
HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3
(2010).
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Although each policy decision will require its own analysis, the
relevant questions confronting the decision maker will be:
• Is it more costly for government to identify one effective so-
lution and ensure it is being used? (Means standards)
• Or is it more costly for government to establish a way of
monitoring the outcomes of many different solutions? (Per-
formance standards)
If there is a known means, one that is already being used effectively
by many firms, then the costs of finding a means-based solution
should be low. The costs of finding such a solution may also be
lower for simple problems than for complex problems. But then
again, it may well be easiest of all, whether the problem is simple or
complex, to embed the regulatory goal into a performance
standard.
But that does not mean it will be easy to ensure that regulated
firms actually meet the regulatory goal. When it comes to enforce-
ment costs, performance standards that require “in-use” or
continuous monitoring are likely to be more costly than standards
that can be enforced by testing samples or perhaps just by making
predictions.87 In some cases, the costs of monitoring the required
performance will be prohibitively high, such as with regulation
aimed at preventing low-probability catastrophic loss. If a perform-
ance standard were simply to say, “Do not construct a building that
can burn down quickly,” the regulator (and the building’s occu-
pants) may not know if the standard has been met until the
building catches fire—which will obviously be too late.88
In comparing governmental costs to estimated cost-savings from
performance standards, it should be remembered that the actual
cost-savings to regulated industry will likely vary depending on the
way a performance standard is designed. Although performance
standards do promise cost-savings, as I explained earlier, different
types of performance standards are likely to yield different levels of
savings. Assuming equivalent social benefits can be achieved, the
savings in social costs from performance standards will generally be
higher:
87. Cf. Colin S. Diver, Regulatory Precision, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 222 (Keith
Hawkins & John M. Thomas, eds., 1989) (“The larger number of . . . events governed by the
rule, the larger the number of times that the agency is called upon to make an authoritative
determination.”).
88. Coglianese, Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 714.
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• The closer the performance standard is to the ultimate ob-
jective (for this allows the firm more flexibility than if
performance is applied to only one causal branch leading to
the ultimate objective).
• The easier it is for the firm to demonstrate performance or
to be assured it will be found in compliance (for this makes
it less costly for the firm to try some new means of meeting
the required performance).
• The greater the background incentives that firms have to in-
novate (for as I have noted, uniform performance standards
themselves do not create new incentives to innovate simply
because they are performance-based).
In situations where firms have little external incentive to innovate,
where it is difficult or costly for firms to be assured that trying new
approaches will still meet required performance levels, or where
the performance standard is set so far back on a causal chain that it
does not afford much real flexibility, the cost differences between
performance standards and means standards may be minimal or
even nonexistent.
One final comment bears mention when it comes to the relative
costs of performance standards versus means standards. It is some-
times said that a hybrid regulatory approach would be best,
specifically one that combines performance standards with means-
based codes of practice or guidance.89 Such a hybrid approach gives
more sophisticated firms the ability to innovate and adapt, while at
the same time it gives clear guidance to those firms that simply want
to know “what do I do.” Although this may seem like an ideal solu-
tion, it is only likely to increase governmental costs. With hybrids,
government faces higher costs of analysis and decision making over
any alternative—that is, against either a pure means standard or a
pure performance standard—since government must both find a
recommended means and establish an appropriate performance
goal. Since the monitoring costs for pure performance standards
are normally thought to be greater than for pure means stan-
dards,90 the hybrid approach will result in monitoring costs for
government that are higher than a pure means standard but lower
than a pure performance standard. Furthermore, the social—that
is, nongovernmental—costs of the hybrid will equal a pure per-
formance standard only if the firms that follow the code of practice
89. Id. at 713.
90. See BREYER, supra note 62, at 105 (noting that performance standards are more diffi-
cult to enforce).
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are those for which the code represents their lowest-cost strategy.
But if some firms follow the code even though it contains, in rela-
tion to their particular circumstances, a higher-cost means (for
reasons of inertia or convenience), then social costs could be
higher than a pure performance standard but lower than a pure
means standard (assuming that at least some firms do depart from
the code when a lower-cost means is known).
V. THE DANGERS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of performance standards,
and their endorsement in governmental proclamations around the
world, the ultimate value of any performance-based regulation will
depend on what it ultimately delivers. While systematic empirical
research on performance standards remains to be undertaken, ex-
perience with at least some performance standards reveals several
unacknowledged or little emphasized limitations of performance-
based regulation. It is, of course, possible that performance stan-
dards are still “generally superior” to technology or design
standards, as stated in the U.S. government’s regulatory guidance.91
But the seemingly unbridled enthusiasm for performance-based
regulation by regulatory commentators and officials around the
world masks some of its challenges and limitations.
In this final Part of this Article, I offer a corrective account of
performance standards, pointing to seven problems that can arise
with performance standards. Of course, recognizing more com-
pletely performance standards’ dangers and limitations is not to
counsel against ever using them. The recitation of limitations in
this Part of this Article should, though, make policymakers more
attentive in the future, so that they no longer act on the basis of
generalizations about performance-based regulation that are either
too sweeping or too optimistic. Ultimately, the performance of per-
formance-based regulation is an empirical question. As a result,
when regulatory officials find themselves considering performance
standards, which indeed can be superior in some respects, they also
should recognize that performance standards cannot do every-
thing—and they may even at times pose some of their own unique
perils.
91. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 5.
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A. Failure to avoid conflict
Although not a danger per se, it is worth noting at the outset that
the flexibility afforded by a performance-based approach does not
necessarily translate into reduced conflict or litigation over regula-
tion. It has sometimes been suggested that a shift to performance-
based regulation would result in less adversarial and more collabo-
rative regulation.92 But this is not always so. The EPA’s experience
regulating heavy-duty diesel emissions certainly did not avoid con-
flict. In 1972, the EPA issued standards that are similar in many
respects to the standards the U.K. adopted for mobile machinery.
The EPA’s standards limited carbon monoxide emissions from
heavy-duty diesel truck engines to 40 g/BHP-hr and imposed a
combined standard for hydrocarbons and NOx (nitrous oxide) of
16 g/BHP-hr.93 These emissions standards were expressed as g/
BHP-hr—grams of emissions per brake horsepower-hour—to focus
on the relationship between the engine’s emissions and the amount
of work it does, as measured by a dynamometer or friction brake
applied to the drive shaft. The regulation required testing emis-
sions following a protocol known as the “steady state” test—running
a prototype engine through thirteen separate “modes” (speeds and
torques) specified by the EPA and then averaging the resulting
emissions captured by a machine analyzer.94 This was a classic per-
formance standard: the EPA did not specify how engine
manufacturers should design and build their engines to meet these
tests. It only required that their engines meet the test.
At various times over the years, environmental groups, manufac-
turers, and government have all resorted to litigation over these
EPA performance standards. Environmental groups went to court
in 1984 to force the EPA to issue separate NOx emissions stan-
dards.95 Industry groups filed suit to compel the EPA to delay the
implementation of the new standards in 1986.96 And in 1998, the
EPA filed an enforcement action against the engine manufacturers
and secured the largest settlement (as of that date) in the EPA’s
history.97 This case shows that there is nothing inherent in perform-
ance-based regulation that can reconcile the different interests at
92. See Blumenauer, supra note 73, at 364.
93. 37 Fed. Reg. 18262, 18264 (Sept. 8, 1972).
94. Id.
95. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env’t. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1953
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1984).
96. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.D.C. 1986).
97. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOJ, EPA Announce One Billion Dollar Settlement with
Diesel Engine Industry for Clean Air Violations (Oct. 22, 1998), http://yosemite.epa.gov/
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stake over regulation nor make organizations avoid pursuing their
interests through litigation.
B. Unintended consequences from unrecognized tradeoffs
Tradeoffs are a staple of policymaking, but the implications of
such tradeoffs have previously remained unacknowledged in the
literature on performance-based regulation. This is unfortunate be-
cause if tradeoffs are not clearly identified when setting
performance standards, the regulator risks adopting a standard that
achieves one goal at the expense of other goals. The histories of the
CPSC’s child resistant packaging regulation and of NHTSA’s air
bag regulations are compelling, albeit tragic, examples of how a my-
opic use of performance standards to achieve one objective can
result in significant losses in terms of other important objectives or
values.
The CPSC’s performance standard helped ensure that drug
packaging was hard for children to open—after all, it called for test-
ing to ensure that eighty-five percent of children could not open
packaging in five minutes. Yet, packaging that met this standard
also proved difficult for many adults to open. Subsequent studies
showed that about seventy percent of female and forty percent of
male senior citizens could not open child-resistant containers—and
that even between twenty-two and sixty-four percent of adults be-
tween the ages of eighteen to forty-five experienced difficulties.98 As
a result, frustrated adults took steps to subvert child-resistant de-
signs, such as leaving medicine packages open or transferring pills
into containers that were easier to open. A 1989 report found that
more than fifty percent of accidental ingestions by young children
occurred when adults left pills lying loose or transferred them into
other, non-resistant packaging.99 The CPSC eventually revised its
performance standard to include a test both for child-resistance and
opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/93e9e651adeed6b7852566a60069
ad2e; Mike Osenga, Diesel Industry Confronts the Emissions Settlement, DIESEL PROG. 42 (Dec.
1998).
98. Frederick T. Sherman, Joshua D. Warach & Leslie S. Libow, Child-Resistant Containers
for the Elderly?, 241 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1001, 1001 (1979); Philip A. Atkin et al., Functional Ability
of Patients to Manage Medication Packaging: A Survey of Geriatric Patients, 23 AGE & AGING 113,
115 (1994); Requirements for the Special Packaging of Household Substances, 60 Fed. Reg.
37710, 37720, 37730 (July 21, 1995).
99. Barbara J. Jacobsen et al., Accidental Ingestions of Oral Prescription Drugs: A Multicenter
Survey, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 853 (1989).
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adult ease of opening100—but for more than a decade the perform-
ance test essentially overlooked the tradeoff between child
resistance and adult access.
A similar “tunnel vision” afflicted NHTSA over its air bag per-
formance standards. NHTSA’s prescribed performance test used
crash test dummies proportioned to the size of the average-sized
adult male.101 Air bags that met this performance test have, to
NHTSA’s credit, saved many lives.102 But tragically, they also led to
the development of air bag systems that sometimes harmed, even
killed, smaller statured adults and children, even in accidents where
these smaller occupants otherwise would have survived.103 The
rapid deployment of airbags creates a force against smaller individ-
uals that leads to head and face injuries—sometimes as severe as
decapitations.104 Over time, NHTSA and the auto industry have
worked to see the development of “smart” airbag technologies that
now can meet a more multi-faceted performance test.105 But for
many years, the performance standard approach proved harmful
for some drivers and passengers due to inadequate attention in ini-
tial performance standards to the tradeoffs between protection for
average-sized males and the harms to smaller individuals.106
C. Regulatory red tape
Regulation is routinely criticized for imposing burdensome,
dense requirements that consume page after page of code books.107
Are performance standards an answer? The EPA’s history of devel-
oping standards for heavy-duty diesel engine emissions shows that
performance-based regulation does not necessarily result in the
100. 16 C.F.R. § 1700.20 (2016).
101. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 65 Fed. Reg.
28,962, 29,009 (July 17, 1984) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208). For a narrative account of
the evolution of airbag regulations, see Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant
Crash Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,680, 30,740 (May 12, 2000).
102. Donna Glassbrenner, Estimating the Lives Saved by Safety Belts and Air Bags (18th Int’l
Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Conf. Paper No. 500, 2003).
103. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS,
COUNTS OF FRONTAL AIR BAG RELATED FATALITIES AND SERIOUSLY INJURED PERSONS (2007).
104. Id.
105. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 552, 571, 585, 595 (establishing performance testing for dynamic
automatic suppression systems rather than merely systems aimed to protect dummies sized as
average adult males).
106. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 343 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 1. See also Patrick McLaughlin, The Code of Federal Regula-
tions: The Ultimate Longread, MERCATUS CENTER (April 1, 2015), http://mercatus.org/publica
tion/code-federal-regulations-ultimate-longread-game-thrones-hunger-games.
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elimination of governmental red tape. In order to give manufactur-
ers discretion to choose how to reduce NOx emissions, the EPA
added layer upon layer of requirements that, over the years, have
grown to an extraordinary level of prescriptiveness in how emis-
sions testing must be done.108 Engine manufacturers now employ
teams of engineers to understand and comply with these require-
ments.109 Moreover, even when industry experts think they have
met the government’s tests, the EPA still can threaten to withhold a
certificate of conformity and pursue enforcement actions against
manufacturers.110 This is far from a system that fosters simplicity
and certainty. Not only are the costs and complexity of these emis-
sions performance standards a burden for industry; they have not
proven easy or cheap for government to design. It has taken the
agency decades to refine its testing protocols.
D. Limited discretion and flexibility
As noted, the main theoretical advantage of performance stan-
dards comes from the flexibility they provide to regulated entities.
But as I have explained, the level of discretion that a performance
standard provides can vary dramatically. For example, when consid-
ering flexibility in reference to the underlying regulatory goal, the
closer the binding regulatory standard is to the regulation’s ulti-
mate goal, the greater the discretion that the regulated entity will
generally enjoy.111 If the ultimate goal of an environmental regula-
tion is to reduce the health effects from human exposure to ground
level ozone, then regulated firms will have more discretion the
more closely tied their obligation is to this goal. After all, the health
effects of ozone could be reduced by, among other things, alerting
citizens to stay indoors on days with high smog levels, reducing pol-
lution from stationary sources, reducing evaporative emissions of
volatile organic compounds from automobiles, or reducing tailpipe
hydrocarbon or NOx emissions from mobile sources.112 But even if
108. 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001).
109. See Occupational Outlook Handbook: Mechanical Engineers, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/OOH/architecture-and-engineering/mechanical-engi
neers.htm#tab-6 (noting strong job prospects for mechanical engineers and the demand for
design of cleaner technology).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7525(a)(3)(A), 7524(b) (2012).
111. Bennear & Coglianese, Flexible Environmental Regulation, supra note 43; Coglianese,
Nash & Olmstead, supra note 2, at 710.
112. EPA, Ozone Reduction Strategies—Tips to Reduce Ozone—Control Measures, https://web.
archive.org/web/20150216021610/http://www.epa.gov/airquality/ozonestrategy/control
measures.html.
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all four of these options were equally effective in protecting public
health, only one of them will satisfy the regulator’s command if the
agency tells vehicle manufacturers to control tailpipe emissions—
even if they do so using performance standards.
Of course, a performance-based tailpipe standard still allows en-
gine and vehicle manufacturers to consider a range of options that
they might not otherwise be allowed to consider if the government
selected the precise means to achieve the desired reductions in
tailpipe emissions. Options that remain might include the design of
engine operating conditions (such as timing, fuel injection, and so
forth), changes to fuel, and installation of after-treatment devices.
Yet in reality, even all of these options for reducing tailpipe emis-
sions might not be available to the manufacturer. The history of the
EPA’s heavy-duty diesel emissions regulation indicates that a per-
formance standard is little different than a design or technology
standard if only one known or available means will meet the man-
dated performance level. For example, once the EPA reduced its
permissible 2007 NOx limits by nearly ninety percent,113 engine
manufacturers for all practical purposes were forced to adopt after-
treatment solutions—that was the only available means that would
meet the new performance standard.114
F. Potential for fraud or evasive behavior
Over the decades, the implementation of the EPA’s heavy-duty
diesel emissions standards has been accompanied by the develop-
ment of a variety of testing protocols: from “steady-state” to
multiple versions of “transient” tests to experimentation with lim-
ited in-use testing.115 At each stage, as the EPA tried different
protocols to monitor engines’ performance, the agency learned
that the previous version of its testing did not adequately reflect
what the agency sought to measure.116 It may seem almost a truism
to note that performance standards depend on the ability of gov-
ernment agencies to specify, measure, and monitor performance.
But it is often not acknowledged how difficult, if not impossible, it
113. 40 C.F.R. § 86.007-11 (2015).
114. See Thomas A. Dollmeyer et al., Meeting the U.S. 2007 Heavy-Duty Diesel Emission Stan-
dards—Designing for the Customer, COM. VEHICLE EMISSIONS UPDATE, 2007.
115. Alan C. Lloyd & Thomas A. Cackette, Diesel Engines: Environmental Impact and Control,
51 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 809 (2001).
116. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law of the Test: Performance-Based Regulations
and Diesel Emissions Control, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming).
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sometimes can be to obtain reliable and appropriate information
on performance.
The recent transatlantic scandal over emissions from Volkswagen
diesel automobiles has revealed even more starkly the vital role of
effective monitoring in a performance-based regulatory scheme. In
September 2015, the EPA accused Volkswagen of installing software
in what amounted to an estimated eleven million cars with diesel
engines that detected when the cars were being tested for nitrogen
oxide emissions.117 According to the EPA, the company’s cars met
emissions standards in the laboratory or testing station, but during
normal operation they emitted nitrogen oxides up to forty times
permissible levels.118 Volkswagen, which subsequently admitted the
“misconduct,”119 apparently evaded regulators in both the United
States and in Germany for seven years.120 Although the firm itself
bears responsibility for circumventing the regulators’ testing, the
fact that the firm succeeded in evading attention for so long testi-
fies to the inadequacy of the government’s oversight.121 Tellingly,
Volkswagen only succumbed to detection when a small nonprofit
group hired a few researchers at West Virginia University to test just
three Volkswagen vehicles.122 It should not have been difficult for
regulators to have detected the violations themselves much earlier.
In November 2015, the EPA issued a second notice of violation,
alleging that Volkswagen also installed a similar “defeat device” on
three-liter engines used in luxury sedans and sport-utility vehicles
produced by the company’s Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche
117. Letter from Phillip A. Brooks, EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assur-
ance, to Volkswagen AG, Sept. 18, 2015, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
10/documents/vw-nov-caa-09-18-15.pdf (notice of violation); William Boston & Sarah Sloat,
Volkswagen Emissions Scandal Relates to 11 Million Cars, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-relates-to-11-million-cars-1442916906.
118. Chris Isidore & Peter Valdes-Dapena, EPA Accuses VW of Cheating on Emission Rules,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 22, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/autos/epa-cheating-vw/.
119. See, e.g., Statement by Prof. Dr. Winterkorn, VOLKSWAGEN (Sept. 23, 2015), https://
www.volkswagen-media-services.com/en/detailpage/-/detail/Statement-by-Prof-Dr-Winter
korn/view/2721302/7a5bbec13158edd433c6630f5ac445da?p_p_auth=6jhXNw3R.
120. See, e.g., Notice of Violation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/vw-nov-caa-09-18-15.pdf; Learn About
Volkswagen Violations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.epa.gov/vw/
learn-about-volkswagen-violations.
121. See generally David Auerbach, Volkswagen’s Villains, SLATE.COM (Oct. 1, 2015), http://
www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/10/volkswagen_s_emissions_scandal_has_
a_villain_and_it_s_the_not_the_people.html.
122. Jeff Plungis & Dana Hull, VW’s Emissions Cheating Found by Curious Clean-Air Group,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-19/
volkswagen-emissions-cheating-found-by-curious-clean-air-group.
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brands.123 Volkswagen is now facing fines in the United States of up
to eighteen billion dollars in civil penalties under federal statutes.124
Remarkably, there remains some question whether Volkswagen will
ever face any similar penalties in Europe because E.U. regulations
state that “the settings of the engine and of the vehicle’s controls
shall be those prescribed by the manufacturer.”125 Regardless of what
ultimately happens in Europe, the Volkswagen scandal drives home
the importance of testing and monitoring for any effective perform-
ance-based regulatory regime. Perhaps if regulators do not hear
only unqualifiedly enthusiastic messages in support of perform-
ance-based regulation, they might be more vigilant in the future
about how they monitor compliance once regulated firms start to
take advantage of the flexibility that performance standards offer.126
F. “Teaching to the test”
Previously unrecognized in the regulatory context is how per-
formance-based regulation raises a concern similar to a well-known
problem in the field of education called “teaching to the test.” In
education, this problem arises when students only learn strategies
to score high on tests, and therefore fail to develop the underlying
core skills that the tests are intended to measure.127 As with stu-
dents, regulated firms may use the flexibility afforded them under
performance-based regulation to find ways to satisfy performance
standards but depart from regulators’ goals.
In 1980, the EPA established a transient test and required diesel
engine manufacturers to pass it.128 The manufacturers built engines
that met the EPA’s standards based on the testing protocol that the
123. Chris Ziegler, Another Volkswagen Diesel Engine Is Cheating Emissions Tests, EPA Claims,
THE VERGE (Nov. 2, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/2/9659382/volks
wagen-diesel-audi-porsche-3-liter-emissions-cheat-defeat-device-epa; Press Release, EPA, Cali-
fornia Notify Volkswagen of Additional Clean Air Act Violations (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.
epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-california-notify-volkswagen-additional-clean-air-act-violations.
124. Claudia Assis, Volkswagen at Risk of $18 Billion EPA Fine, CBS MARKETWATCH (Sept. 18,
2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/volkswagen-at-risk-of-18-billion-epa-
fine-2015-09-18.
125. Danny Hakim & Claire Barthelemy, VW’s Emissions-Test Trickery May Not Be Illegal in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/business/interna
tional/vw-scandal-eu-emissions-tests.html?_r=0.
126. See generally Coglianese, supra note 18.
127. See, e.g., W. James Popham, Teaching to the Test?, 58 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 16, 16 (2001);
Linda Crocker, Teaching for the Test: Validity, Fairness, and Moral Action, 22 EDUC. MEASURE-
MENT 5, 5–6 (2003).
128. Standard for Emission of Particulate Regulation for Diesel-Fueled Light-Duty Vehi-
cles and Light-Duty Trucks, 45 Fed. Reg. 14,496 (Mar. 5, 1980).
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agency had established. Yet, the government later claimed in a law-
suit that the manufacturers “complied” in a way incompatible with
the overarching regulatory goal of reducing NOx emissions.129 The
manufacturers allegedly designed engines that would optimize fuel
mix to meet the performance test for the duration of the testing
protocol, but when the trucks were in use on the roads the onboard
computers would automatically adjust that mix afterwards to opti-
mize engine performance for truck drivers, which diminished the
emissions control.130
Performance-based regulation gives industry an opportunity to
achieve its own goals within the constraints set forth by the regula-
tion. With performance-based regulation, the command “Do not
exceed the standard” may well translate to “You can proceed to
market your products or operate your facilities however you see fit,
just as long as you do not technically exceed the standard.” Firms
seek to meet the standard and still optimize their private interests,
for instance by minimizing costs of compliance. There is nothing
intrinsically wrong with this logic, but it does create the possibility
that firms will find ways to meet regulators’ tests that satisfy indus-
try’s goals, but not the goals of either the regulator or society.131
G. Incorrect proxies and causal factors
Even if performance standards are set based on some precursor
to, or proxy for, the ultimate outcome of concern to society, and
even if firms fully comply with both their letter and their spirit, the
standards may still fail. For example, economists Maximilian Auf-
fhammer and Ryan Kellogg have studied empirically the impact of
EPA’s performance standards for reformulated gasoline, finding
that they failed to result in any demonstrable reductions in ground-
level ozone—the problem they were supposed to solve.132 The fed-
eral gasoline standards failed because they gave firms too much
flexibility. Performance was defined broadly to include all volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), and refiners responded by choosing
to reduce butane, a VOC which is cheaper to control but not
129. Bruce Yandle, Andrew P. Morriss & Lea-Rachel Kosnik, Heavy-Duty Diesel-Engine Liti-
gation, in REGULATION BY LITIGATION (Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle and Andrew Dorchak,
eds., 2009).
130. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 116.
131. May, supra note 12, at 397.
132. Maximilian Auffhammer & Ryan Kellogg, Clearing the Air? The Effects of Gasoline Con-
tent Regulation on Air Quality, 101 AMER. ECON. REV. 2687, 2687 (2011).
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strongly related to ground-level ozone. California, by contrast, es-
tablished more narrow standards targeted at specific VOCs that are
strongly related to ground-level ozone, and as a result the state stan-
dards led to substantial reductions in ozone.133
Just as with the federal reformulated gasoline standards, any per-
formance standards can occur if there is a faulty or incomplete
causal linkage between the performance specified in the regulation
and the desired state of the world. If the performance required is
unrelated to the desired outcomes, or if it is too broadly defined so
that firms can comply in ways that will have no impact on the de-
sired outcome, then these standards will fail. In addition, problems
that performance standards seek to address may still persist if other
factors, unaffected by the regulation, contribute to the problem or
if the regulation fails to address the root causes of the problem.134
Of course, this can also be true for means standards135—as can
some of the other limitations reviewed in this section—but the pos-
sibility of poorly conceived and designed performance standards
serves as a reminder that their performance-based nature makes
them no panacea.
CONCLUSION
In calling attention to these limits and dangers of performance-
based regulation, I do not mean to suggest that regulators should
never use it. On the contrary, performance standards do hold cer-
tain advantages in appropriate circumstances, and they will
sometimes be the best regulatory instrument available. But not al-
ways. Performance standards depend on the ability of government
agencies to specify, measure, and monitor performance, and relia-
ble and appropriate information about performance may
sometimes be difficult or impossible to obtain. When crafted or im-
plemented in the wrong way, or under the wrong conditions,
performance-based regulation can perform badly (as can any regu-
latory instrument that is ineffectually deployed). The key question
for decision makers is this: Are the problems associated with partic-
ular performance standards worse than the problems associated
with their alternative technology or design standards?
133. Id. at 2688–89.
134. May, supra note 131, at 383.
135. See, e.g., David L. Strayer et al., A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk
Driver, 48 HUM. FACTORS 2, 381, 388 (2006) (showing that conversations on hands-free and
hand-held devices are equally dangerous to drivers, and casting doubt on legislative efforts to
mandate the former for use by drivers seeking to make phone calls).
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If governments around the world are to rely more heavily on per-
formance standards, regulators that design and implement them
should do so fully aware of both their advantages and limitations.
Successful regulation requires that regulators understand their op-
tions when choosing among different types of regulation and that
they make their choices while fully cognizant of various features
even within the same instrument type.136 Rather than relying on
general claims about the superiority of some regulatory types over
others, regulators need to analyze carefully the likely consequences
of each relevant design choice under the conditions anticipated.137
They also need to review and reevaluate regulations after they are
adopted to ensure that they are working as intended.138 This is
clearly true of performance-based regulation, which unfortunately
has at times been implicated in regulatory tragedies that might have
been avoided had regulators not focused so single-mindedly on the
policy goal motivating the regulation. In the end, it should be clear
that effective use of performance-based regulation calls for analytic
sophistication: regulators must identify the major contributors to a
regulatory problem, understand how these factors relate to each
other and cause the problem, and determine which measures and
monitoring techniques will effectively ensure compliance. At bot-
tom, good performance-based regulation is no less, and is
sometimes more, demanding of regulators than any other form of
regulation.
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